Spanish mood and the expression of cognitive and evaluative meaning*

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0. INTRODUCTION

According to a current philosophical point of view, the human mind can be conceived of as being composed of three modules, namely, thought, feeling and will. Functionally, these categories have been described in terms of the cognitive mode, the emotional mode and the conative mode, respectively (Ryle 1970: 61).

Within linguistic representation, it is clause embedding predicates which serve the particular purpose of providing information about the aforementioned categorization. Specifically, these predicates cover the conceptual field of the set of chronologically ordered processes which underly intentional human behavior. The input-output system involved is lexically represented by three major classes of clause-embedding predicates. Firstly, the class of predicates denoting perceptual stimuli, which function as the physiological input to the human mind; secondly, the class of predicates denoting the storing and processing of these stimuli, that is, cognitive and evaluative predicates, and, finally, the class of predicates denoting categories involved in producing the output of intentional behavior, viz., volition, causation, mental acts and speech acts.

Philosophers have discussed the components of this tripartite system mainly in terms of different kinds of propositional attitudes. Consider, for instance, the following quotation from Barwise and Perry:

If single statements describe situations, then attitude reports must describe situations involving the attitudes, perceptual situations p in the case of sees and sees that, epistemic

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Most linguistic research into clause-embedding predicates has been concerned with phenomena of a specific syntactic or semantic nature. As to the former, one may think of the interest shown by transformational grammar in formal operations such as subject, object, and negative raising. Semantic analyses have been applied in particular to languages in which the verb of the embedded clause is subject to modal variation, which, for instance, is a striking characteristic of Romance languages. Within the framework of traditional grammar, modal distribution in complement clauses is usually considered to be dependent on the lexical meaning of the matrix predicate. As has been illustrated with respect to Spanish (Haverkate 1989: 58-59), the analyses involved typically show two major shortcomings. Firstly, they are not optimal in the sense that the classifications set up do not rest upon explicitly formulated taxonomic criteria. Secondly, they are not maximal in the sense that they do not exhaustively specify the class of clause-embedding predicates. The latter shortcoming is mainly due to the fact that traditional grammar fails to treat the category of clause-embedding predicates as an integral, self-consistent part of the lexicon, as a result of which, in not a few cases, the modal structure of complement clauses is described in a purely ad hoc way. This point will be elaborated on in the final section of the paper, which is devoted to a critical evaluation of a specific English textbook of Spanish.

As suggested above, the lexical meaning of clause-embedding predicates should be described in terms of the structure of the input-output mechanism that underlies intentional human behavior. Now, it is the aim of the present paper to conduct research into the modal behavior of those Spanish clause-embedding predicates that denote the storing and processing of perceptual stimuli, that is, predicates involved in the expression of cognition and evaluation.

It was pointed out before that in some languages the use of cognitive and evaluative predicates formally correlates with a specific modal inflection of the subordinated verb, whereas in other languages it does not. Thus, for instance, in Spanish the modal pattern at issue manifests itself in the distribution of the indicative and the subjunctive mood, whereas in English the selection of the subjunctive is blocked. Obviously, this parametric distinction creates a language acquisition problem for English learners of Spanish. In relation to this, it will be argued that, in order to correctly apply modal distinctions in Spanish clauses subordinated to cognitive and evaluative main verbs, it is sufficient for native speakers of English to gain insight into two categories of propositional meaning: truth value and information value.

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1 Among the wide variety of Spanish dialects and groups of dialects modern Peninsular Spanish has been chosen as the object of research of the present paper.
The lexical distinction between cognitive and evaluative predicates should be characterized in the following way: the former bring into focus the truth value of the embedded proposition while the latter denote an assessment of the factual state of affairs described by the embedded proposition. It follows that both classes of predicates are related by virtue of the fact that evaluation presupposes cognition. Put another way, the parameters of asserted and presupposed truth value are essential to an integrated analysis of the predicates under discussion. A major focus of interest, therefore, will be two different ways in which the propositional content of the subordinated clause is brought to the attention of the interlocutor; that is to say, in cognitive sentences this information is presented from a foregrounding of focalizing perspective while in evaluative sentences it is basically presented from a backgroundering or defocalizing perspective.

The organization of this paper is as follows. In the first two sections an analysis will be conducted into both the semantic and pragmatic interpretation of cognitive and evaluative predicates. Attention will be focused on lexical meaning as a trigger of modal selection in Spanish complement clauses. It will be shown that the expression of cognition and evaluation correlates in a systematic way with the distribution of the indicative and the subjunctive mood.

The final section is devoted to a comparison between the results obtained from the present study and the treatment of the modal categories under review in Ramsey A textbook of modern Spanish, a classic among reference grammars of Spanish, as may be seen, for instance, from the following qualification of the author of the book: “Perhaps the most competent American scholar ever to set down his views on the Spanish grammatical system, Marathon Montrouze Ramsey [. . . ]” (Stockwell, Bowen & Martin (1969: VII)).

1. COGNITIVE PREDICATES

The defining semantic characteristic of cognitive predicates is the expression of the attitude the subject of the matrix clause adopts concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition. In this paper, the current linguistic and philosophical point of view is adhered to that the class of cognitive predicates can be properly divided into an epistemic, a doxastic, and a dubitative subclass.

The lexical properties of these subclasses can be described in terms of scalar magnitudes representing different degrees of commitment to truth value. Thus, the degree denoted by epistemic predicates is that of certainty, the degree denoted by doxastic predicates is that of belief, and the degree denoted by dubitative predicates is that of doubt.

Furthermore, it is an inherent characteristic of each of these subclasses that, in negative sentences, their members may be involved in a shift in cognitive meaning, so that, for example, a negative doxastic expression, such as No creo que venga (SUBJ), is conceptually

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3 The terms ‘foregrounding’ and ‘defocalizing’ were introduced to Hervé Hume (1984) to denote foregrounding and backgroundering strategies in the expression of referential meaning.
equivalent to the affirmative dubitative expression *Dudo de que venga* (SUBJ). A similar relationship holds between the negative dubitative expression *No dudo de que venga* (IND) and the affirmative epistemic expression *Estoy seguro de que viene* (IND).

From a pragmatic point of view, the different classes of cognitive predicates can be characterized in the following way: the use of an epistemic predicate reflects the subject's confidence in the truth of the information specified by the subordinated proposition while the use of a dubitative predicate implies the subject's willingness to admit of a challenge being made to the propositional attitude taken, and the use of a dubitative predicate implies the subject's interest in being informed concerning the truth of the state of affairs expressed by the subordinated proposition.*

1.1 Epistemic predicates

The type of lexical information denoted by epistemic predicates can be defined as follows: the complement proposition of an epistemic predicate describes a state of affairs which the grammatical orational subject of the matrix clause assumes corresponds with factual reality. Therefore, this lexical class serves to indicate real facts stored in the memory of the subject of the predicate, which is equivalent to stating that the propositional content of the complement clause forms part of his/her cognitive experience. From an interactional perspective, propositions subordinated to epistemic predicates may be characterized in terms of:

[...] propositions which are taken for granted via the force of diverse conventions, as unchallengable by the hearer and thus requiring no evidentiary justifications by the speaker (Givón 1982: 24).

For purposes of illustration, consider the following examples:

(1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sí</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estoy enterado de</td>
<td>que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es cierto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The use of *sí, estoy enterado de*, and *es cierto* indicates that the speaker considers the proposition *el presidente fue asesinado* to represent a real state of affairs. This proposition forms part of his/her factual knowledge, which, as observed by Givón in the aforementioned quotation, is equivalent to stating that the speaker of this sentence doesn't expect the hearer to challenge the truth of the embedded proposition, that is, he/she is not supposed to provide "evidentiary justifications" for that truth. Observe that it would be inappropriate for the hearer

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* It has been pointed out by Truscott (1983) that the different degrees of truth-functional meaning as indicated by the three types of cognitive predicates can be made explicit in Japanese by means of a set of specific sentence-final particles.
to react to the assertion with a why-question, as may be seen from the lack of pragmatic wellformedness of (1a) as a request for information concerning the reason the speaker of (1) is in the cognitive state expressed:

(1a)  *¿Por qué sabes que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado?*

Though informative questions may not focus on epistemic justification, they may focus on the source or origin of the factual knowledge referred to. Thus, an appropriate reaction to (1) would be:

(1b)  ¿Cómo sabes que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado?*

Further note that the occurrence of epistemic predicates is not blocked in negative por qué questions. Compare, for instance:

(1c)  ¿Por qué no sabes que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado?

As to pragmatic analysis, it has been argued (Haverkate 1979: 115-117) that in cases, such as (1c), we are typically dealing with indirect speech acts characterized by the interaction of an interrogative and an expressive illocutionary goal. The interrogative goal, which bears upon the justification of a negative state of affairs, is explicitly formulated by means of the por qué question. The expressive goal has to be inferred from the interrogative one; it implies a reproach that the hearer is not in the epistemic state referred to.

Turning next to cómo questions, we also find that affirmative and negative realizations correspond to radically different pragmatic interpretations. That is, while (1b) is perfectly well formed, its negative counterpart

(1d)  *¿Cómo no sabes que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado?*

is uninterpretable, which is due to the fact that manner adverbs are incompatible with stative verbs. This brings us to the conclusion that saber in (1b) must be assigned a specific nonstative interpretation. More precisely, in this example saber is interpreted as: "haberse enterado de cierta cosa" (Molinari 1967: 1075). Obviously, it is this sense of saber which focuses on the source or origin of the factual knowledge involved. Affirmative cómo questions, then, serve to elicit information concerning that source or origin.

In conclusion, with respect to modal distribution, it should be pointed out that the examples dealt with above are illustrative of the fact that the members of the class of

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*Ames (1977: 218) describes an informative question like (1b) in terms of: "... a request for a statement of the person's evidential position, that is, what puts the person in a position to know."*
epistemic predicates behave uniformly in that they select the indicative mood in the complement clause. This is in accordance with the general role of Spanish that asserting positive truth value requires the use of the indicative.

Further note that the negative use of epistemic predicates may involve a shift in cognitive meaning, as a result of which a dubitative interpretation is at stake. The corresponding expression of indeterminate truth value requires the use of the subjunctive mood. This may be seen form an example such as:

(1c) No sé que el presidente fuera (SUBJ) asesinado.

However, negative epistemic matrices do not necessarily express dubitative meaning. Compare, for instance, example (1c), where the indicative mood is obligatory because of the fact that the embedded proposition bears upon a factual state of affairs.

1.2 Doxastic predicates

The lexical content of doxastic predicates can be defined in terms of the following propositional attitude: the grammatical or notional subject of the predicate has reasonable grounds for believing that the state of affairs expressed by the complement clause corresponds with factual reality. The reasonable grounds underlying the subject's belief are often made explicit by causal clauses, not only in argumentative types of discourse, but in everyday conversation⁵. It follows that propositions subordinated to doxastic predicates may be qualified as:

{ ... } propositions that are asserted with relative confidence, averse to challenge by the hearer and thus require or admit, evidentiary justification (Givón 1982: 24).

Next, compare the following set of examples:

(2) Creo
    Supongo
    Me parece 

The speaker who utters one of these sentences does not commit him/herself fully to the truth of the subordinated proposition, but is supposed to be relatively certain that that

⁵ In more general terms, it may be argued that speakers tend to express themselves in such a way that their interlocutors consider them to be reasonable thinking and acting persons. This point of view is reflected by the following statement concerning the speech act of arguing:

Thus, instead of presupposing that the goal of arguing is to convince the other of the truth of one's own statement (opinion), of reaching a common, we can now include a goal such as conveying a certain image of ego to alter (the rational intellectual who "thinks it out logically") (Quintess 1979: 13).
proposition describes a real state of affairs. As pointed out above, this implies that the subject of a doxastic predicate should be able to justify the grounds that underly his/her confidence. Consequently, there is nothing unusual in asking a person who is in a doxastic state to motivate his belief. The following reaction to (2), therefore, would be pragmatically impeccable:

(2a) ¿Por qué crees que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado?

From this example we may further infer that doxastic assertions differ from epistemic ones in that the latter, as shown by (1a), do not elicit requests for justification. Furthermore, we find that, unlike epistemic assertions, doxastic ones cannot serve as a stimulus for asking about information on the source of the belief by means of a manner question. This may be seen, for instance, from the lack of wellformedness of the following reaction to (2):

(2b) *¿Cómo crees que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado?*

In regard to negative por qué and cómo questions, it should be noted that the former type of question has the same degree of acceptability as the corresponding affirmative ones. Consider, for instance:

(2c) ¿Por qué no crees que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado?

This example makes it clear that speakers in a negative doxastic state should be able to motivate their lack of confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed. Eliciting this type of information is the basic function of questions such as (2c), which is equivalent to stating that these questions lack the indirect interpretation which was found to be typical of their epistemic counterparts. In conclusion, turning to negative cómo questions, we observe that the same restriction applies as to affirmative cómo questions; the way in which one believes cannot be problematized neither from an affirmative perspective - compare (2b) - nor from a negative perspective. Compare, for instance:

(2d) *¿Cómo no crees que el presidente fue (IND) asesinado?*

In what follows, our focus of attention will be the selection of mood in doxastic complement clauses. Although sporadic exceptions do occur, the use of the indicative is the norm preferred

* Note that (2b) is well formed if the question bears upon the content of the embedded proposition: in that case, the person asking the question wishes to know the opinion of the other concerning the way the president was murdered. However, if the embedded proposition does not denote an action or process, the cómo question is inappropriate anyhow. Compare, e.g., *¿Cómo crees que este caso es antiguo?*
by the vast majority of speakers of Peninsular Spanish. Taking up again the criterion of asserting positive truth values, which we claimed to be the distinctive feature of mood selection in epistemic predicates, we may explain the appearance of the indicative in doxastic complements by virtue of the relative confidence the subject of the matrix clause has in the proposition describing a real state of affairs. To elaborate on this point, it is useful to return to the scalar magnitudes set up in section 1 in order to account for the lexical differences between epistemic, doxastic, and dubitative predicates. What we find, then, is that doxastic predicates, which occupy the middle position on the scale, are semantically not equidentant from the two other points. Since their subjects are assigned a relatively strong certainty regarding the truth of the embedded proposition, doxastic predicates are more similar to epistemic ones than to dubitative ones. Though this analysis offers a plausible explanation for the occurrence of the indicative mood in the complement clause, there is another factor to be taken into consideration. That is, doxastic predicates are often used to put forward a standpoint, which necessarily implies the subject's assuming the responsibility for the truth of the embedded proposition. What we are dealing with in this situation, is the intention of the speaker to formulate an opinion in a mitigating way. Thus, instead of saying, for example:

(3) No es una decisión imparcial.

the speaker may express the same standpoint by making an assertion such as

(3a) Me parece que no es (IND) una decisión imparcial.

Evidently, (3a) has a mitigating force, since it literally indicates that the speaker does not assume full responsibility for the truth of the embedded proposition. In cases like these, which have been qualified as 'weak assertions' (Hooper 1975: 101), it is up to the hearer to infer from the doxastic character of the statement that a standpoint is implied by the proposition no es una decisión imparcial.

The weak assertive interpretation also obtains when the doxastic predicate appears in sentence-final position. The syntactic process involved, which is indicated by such different labels as 'complement preposing', 'sentence raising', 'sentence lifting', and even 'slifting' (Ross 1975: 241), is constituted by a movement rule that raises the complement clause to the sentence-initial position. Doxastic predicates occurring in structures to which complement preposing has applied are inflected for indicative mood, simple present tense, and,

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1 However notice that in some varieties of Spanish and in Italian the line of modal demarcation runs between epistemic and doxastic predicates: Debe recordarse que los verbos de asegurar deben más características, como creer y pensar, se construyen con sujeto en italiano moderno y también en español antiguo y dialectal, así que por ello deja de pertenecer a esa clase semántica (Buscar 1995: 30).
since the belief expressed is the belief of the speaker, for first-person singular reference. The pragmatic effect brought about by complement preposing is an afterthought, as may be illustrated by the 'slid' variant of (3a):

(3b) No es (IND) una decisión imparcial, me preocupa.

From (3b) it is also obvious that the expression of an afterthought doesn’t affect the modal inflection of the verb; the use of the indicative mood remains obligatory.

Lastly note that doxastic predicates, by filling the central slot of the scale of cognitive meaning, may not only bring about particular pragmatic effects, they are characterized by syntactic flexibility as well. That is, unlike their epistemic and dubitative counterparts, they do not only allow complement preposing to apply optionally; the same also holds true for negative raising. For illustration purposes, consider the following example;

(4) Creo que ésta no es (IND) la mejor solución de nuestro problema.

Now, the content of this belief may be denied in two different ways, as illustrated by:

(4a) Creo que ésta no es (IND) la mejor solución de nuestro problema.

(4b) No creo que ésta sea (SUBJ) la mejor solución de nuestro problema?

It is evident that, as far as semantic interpretation is concerned, (4a) and (4b) do not provide synonymous information, since in the former example the speaker asserts having a positive belief in the truth of the embedded proposition, whereas in the latter, in which negative raising has applied, the assertion is one of expressing a negative belief concerning that proposition.

At the level of pragmatic analysis, it seems a plausible assumption that many, if not most speakers will prefer variant (4b) if it is their intention not to impose their opinion on the hearer, even though what they actually wish to put forward is the positive belief expressed by (4a). Therefore, what we are concerned with here is a hedging strategy which consists in presenting a doxastic propositional attitude in the form of a dubitative statement, since, as was observed earlier, no creo is conceptually equivalent to dudo. As shown by the inflection of sea in (4b), conveying doubt or uncertainty concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition requires subjunctive complementation.

* In addition to subjective complementation, negative doxastic matrices may also select the injunctive mood, as illustrated by an example such as:

   Carmen no cree que él sea mató (IND) a su amigo.

   This use of the indicative is triggered by the presupposition of the speaker that the embedded proposition corresponds with factual reality. What is expressed by this sentence, is that Carmen doesn't believe what the speaker knows to be true.
Further note that the strategical effect produced by negative raising can be explained in terms of syntactic iconicity. That is to say, in (4a) the stronger force of the assertion is reflected by the fact that the negation fills a slot inside the embedded clause which is under its scope; in (4b), on the other hand, the negation has been transported to the matrix clause, as a result of which the spatial distance created can be taken to iconically reflect the weaker force of the assertion.

From the foregoing we may conclude that Spanish is a language in which the assertive mitigation we have been discussing is coded in two different formal ways: by means of negative raising and by means of subjunctive complementation.

1.3 Dubitative predicates

Dubitative predicates are basically distinct from epistemic and doxastic ones in that their subjects do not assign an absolutely or relatively positive truth value to the embedded proposition. The propositional attitude involved bears upon the fact that the subject is not in a position to ascertain whether or not the state of affairs described corresponds with factual reality. It is for this reason that these propositions may be qualified as:

[...] propositions that are asserted with doubt as hypothesis and are thus beneath both challenge and evidentiary substantiation (Givón 1982: 24).

Note however that the dubitative attitude itself may be problematized by means of both affirmative and negative per quid questions. Cómo questions, on the other hand, are excluded; asking for the way in which one doubts does not elicit sensible information.

From the above it is clear that dubitative statements cannot be justified as far as the truth value of the embedded proposition is concerned. Put differently, speakers making a dubitative statement point out to their hearers that the subject of the matrix clause is not able to judge whether the subordinated proposition is true or false. Consequently, dubitative statements constitute the counterpart of epistemic ones, since the latter focus on the positive truth value of the embedded proposition.

* Compare also the following statement by Lakoff and Johnson:

If the meaning of form A affects the meaning of form B, then, the CLOSER form A is to form B, the STRONGER will be the EFFECT of the meaning of A on the meaning of B. ... There is a rule in English, sometimes called negative reciprocation, which has the effect of placing the negative farther away from the predicate it logically negate; for example, Mary doesn't think he'll leave until tomorrow. Here it's logically negate later rather than think. This sentence has roughly the same meaning as Mary thinks he won't leave until tomorrow, except that in the first sentence, where the negative is FURTHER AWAY from leave, it has a WEAKER negative force. In the second sentence, where the negative is CLOSER the force of the negation is STRONGER (1980: 129).
We may further say that speakers being in a dubitative state must be assigned a stronger belief in the unreality than in the reality of the state of affairs described. This interpretation has been formulated by Auehlin in the following way:

[...] it is generally acknowledged that the expression of assertion of uncertainty is negatively oriented: from "I don't know whether Paul will come" one cannot discursively conclude: "so we had better set a place for him" but rather, "so there is no reason to set a place for him" (1984: 818).

It is suggested by this observation that the dubitative attitude of the subject arises from his/her being in a negative epistemic or doxastic state. This brings us back to the statement made in section 1 that negative matrices such as no saber and no creer are conceptually equivalent to the meaning of the non-analytical lexical item dudar. The following examples illustrate the type of dubitative synonymy involved:

(5) Dudo | No sé | que sea (SUBJ) tan rico.
No creo |

The modal inflection of sea, obligatorily triggered by the use of dudo, no sé and no creo, has already been discussed in connection with example (4b), where it was pointed out that the expression of doubt or uncertainty concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition requires subjunctive complementation.

As for the negative use of dudar, we may refer to section 1, where the example No dudo de que viene (IND) was mentioned to make it clear that negative dubitative expressions are conceptually equivalent to affirmative epistemic ones, and, as a consequence, are marked for the indicative mood.

Finally, returning to the three-point scale of cognitive predicates, we arrive at the conclusion that, in Peninsular Spanish, the subject's attitude concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition is formally reflected by mood selection in the following way: full confidence in positive truth value requires the use of the indicative mood, relative confidence also requires the use of the indicative mood, whereas uncertainty with respect to truth value requires the use of the subjunctive mood.

Lastly note that whichever point of the scale is activated, the judgement of the truth value of the subordinated proposition is always foregrounded, which means that the content of this proposition is attributed a relatively high degree of information value.

2. EVALUATIVE PREDICATES

Evaluative predicates denote the different ways in which their subjects assess the state of affairs described by the complement clause. Since it is the factuality of this state of affairs which underlies the attitude expressed, the evaluating speaker may be said to presuppose
the truth of the embedded proposition. In more general terms, evaluation presupposes cognition.

Conceptually, evaluative predicates are difficult to characterize and we may be fairly sure that they have never been defined in a satisfactory way. The following interpretation by Kiparsky and Kiparsky, who speak of ‘emotivity’, comes closest to the point of view set forth in this paper:

Emotive complements are those to which the speaker expresses a subjective, emotional, or evaluative reaction. The class of predicates taking emotive complements includes the verbs of emotion of classical grammar, and Klima’s affective predicates (…), but is larger than either and includes in general all predicates which express the subjective value of a proposition rather than knowledge about it or its truth value (1971: 363).

Since it is not clear in which sense a subjective reaction of the speaker would differ from an emotional or an evaluative one, in the present context our focus will be on the latter two. In this, we will take the point of view that their relation is of a bynonymous order; that is to say, the class of evaluative predicates is considered to be composed of an emotional and a non-emotional subclass.

Emotional predicates can be divided into two complementary subclasses, according to whether they denote a positive or negative emotive attitude on the part of the grammatical or notional subject of the matrix clause. The former subclass is represented by predicates such as alegrarse, gustar, and encontrar. Some examples of the latter subclass are lamentar, enojar, and molestar.

As implied by the term, non-emotional evaluative predicates indicate a rational or inferential assessment of the state of affairs expressed by the embedded clause. This class of predicates typically manifests itself in the form of third-person singular expressions, such as ser extraño, ser interesante, and ser increíble. It should be noted that the use of these third-person singular expressions implies that the speaker, though not formally referred to, is responsible for the assessment made.

The following set of examples may illustrate the different classes of evaluative predicates distinguished above, (6) expressing a positive emotion, (7) a negative emotion, and (8) a non-emotional evaluation:

(6) Me alegra de que le haya dicho la verdad.
(7) Lamentamos que el embajador no esté (SUBJ presente).
(8) Es extraño que no nos vieras (SUBJ en el futuro).

It is obvious from these examples that the semantic distinction between emotional and non-emotional evaluation does not bear upon mood selection; in either case, the subordinated
clause is marked for subjunctive inflection. Taking into account the factuality of the state of affairs assessed, we may further draw the conclusion that the use of the subjunctive corresponds with a relatively low degree of information value. More precisely, what is focused on by the use of an evaluative predicate is not the propositional content of the embedded clause, but the evaluative judgement on that proposition denoted by the matrix predicate. Evidently, the factual knowledge involved either forms part of the cognitive domain of the speaker or of the cognitive domain mutually shared by the speaker and the hearer.

The modal pattern indicated may undergo a shift should the speaker, for specific communicative purposes, wish to highlight the content of the embedded proposition by means of a cleft construction. What usually happens in this situation is that the indicative mood takes over the complementizer role from the subjunctive. To give a concrete example, we may look at an experiment undertaken by Guitart, who submitted two different interpretations of an evaluative Spanish cleft sentence to the judgement of a group of native speakers:

(17) Una cosa que me molestaba de niño era que...

as part of one experiment the subjects were given the context in in (17):

and were asked to fill it out with what they would tell a biographer who did not know them personally. In this case the information would be presumably unshared. But speakers tend to respond in the Indicative when the experience was of a more private nature and in the Subjunctive when it was a more universal one, as illustrated in (18) with actual responses:
(18) a. Una cosa que me molestaba de niño era que me
atasturaba (IND) estar solo [. . .]

b. Una cosa que me molestaba de niño era que me
pegaran (SUBJ) [. . .]

To the native ear it sounds odd to use the Subjunctive in (18a) because it assumes a non-
existent familiarity of the hearer with speaker’s experience (1984: 165).

The essence of Guitart’s interpretation of (18a) and (18b) bears upon the assumption that
if people are affected by an unpleasant experience when they are young, it will probably
be more often the case that they were beaten than that they felt lonely. Given an unhappy
youth, the former situation is not uncommon, so that a proposition describing that situation
will occupy, to use Lavandera’s (1983) qualification, a position relatively close to “the bottom
of the scale of relevance”. This low degree of information value may be assumed to account
for the preferred use of the subjunctive.

To feel lonely, on the other hand, should be considered an experience which, in the
context given, is less predictable, as a result of which, a proposition describing such an
experience offers a piece of unexpected information, which should be placed at a relatively
high point of the scale of relevance. In this way it can be explained that the persons
participating in the test preferred the use of the indicative mood in the complement clause.

It should be further noticed that, in addition to cleft focus, certain contextual clues,
such as the thematic givenness of a certain assessment, may also contribute to foreground
the factual information expressed by the complement clause. In this connection, compare
the following examples discussed by Borrego, Asencio y Prieto:

- Me preocupa que la Bolsa haya (SUBJ) bajado
  (Recibo un hecho ya conocido para dar mi impresión:

- ¿Qué pasa? ¿Te preocupa algo?
- Sí, me preocupa que la Bolsa ha (IND) bajado
  (Doy mi reacción ante el hecho, pero a la vez

As for the question-answer sequence, we may say that the fact that the speaker uttering
Sí, me preocupa que la Bolsa ha (IND) bajado is worrying about something, forms part of
the thematic information provided by the first member of the adjacency pair. What is
foregrounded by this speaker, is the content of his/her preoccupation. As shown by the
inflection of ha bajado, it is this kind of focalizing factual information which accounts for
the use of the indicative mood.
The analyses carried out in sections 1 and 2 enable us to formulate some general conclusions with respect to modal distribution in the subordinate clauses of Spanish cognitive and evaluative predicates. The indicative is the mood selected in clauses that focus on two degrees of truth value - positive and relatively positive - which are the distinguishing semantic characteristics of propositions subordinated to epistemic and doxastic predicates, respectively. The indicative is also used in clauses that foreground the factual information presupposed by the complement proposition of evaluative predicates.

The use of the subjunctive, on the other hand, corresponds with an indeterminate degree of truth value, that is, the degree inherent to the embedded proposition of dubitative predicates. Furthermore, the subjunctive appears in complement clauses of evaluative sentences that express backgrounded factual information.

The following scheme may serve as a summary:

| Positive truth value | → | INDICATIVE |
| Indeterminate truth value | → | SUBJUNCTIVE |
| Factual information | → | +/- foregrounded |
| + foregrounded | → | INDICATIVE |
| - foregrounded | → | SUBJUNCTIVE |

3. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ENGLISH TEXTBOOKS OF SPANISH

A distinguishing trait of English textbooks of Spanish is the lack of interest in the use of the indicative mood. Thus, for instance, in Ramsey's classic reference grammar *A textbook of modern Spanish* we find an extensive chapter devoted to the use of the subjunctive, but no information whatever on the status of the indicative as an autonomous modal paradigm. As a result, no systematic comparison between the two moods is drawn. Instead, the user of the book is offered a short description and a set of examples of three classes of clause-embedding predicates, which bear the following labels: 'verbs of causing', 'expressions of emotion and feeling' and 'expressions of denial or doubt'. Obviously, for present purposes, it is only the two latter which are of relevance.

The section on expressions of emotion and feeling is introduced in the following way:

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Consider also the following observation:

Most textbooks approach the matter of mood as though it were the subjunctive that must be learned. This approach grossly understates the importance that the subjunctive is something odd or unusual. This approach also assumes that the indicative will take care of itself, and need not be taught. Thus almost no attention is given to the matrix clauses that require indicative complements (Tortilla & Hopper 1974: 409).
[... the subjunctive is required after verbs expressing a feeling about an action of some other person or thing:]

Extraño que V. haya necesitado tanto tiempo.
Celebré que le haya salido tan bien su empresa.
(1964: 417)

Expressions of denial or doubt are characterized in the following way:

When the verb of the principal clause denies, or expresses uncertainty, doubt or disbelief about the action of another person or thing, the verb expressing that action is subjunctive:

Niego que el ebanista tenga la intención de devolver el espejo.
Dudo que sea culpable.
(1964: 419)

I am surprised that you have needed so much time.
I rejoice that his undertaking has turned out so well for him.

I deny that the cabinetmaker intends to return the plane.
I doubt his being guilty.

As follows from the above statements and examples, both classes of expressions are dealt with in terms of a global description of lexical meaning. In this way, it is not made clear to the English learner that the subjunctive forms illustrated by the examples derive from two radically different sources; that is, the expression of emotion and feeling is based on a previous cognitive experience on the part of the subject, so that the subjunctive functions as a marker of the presupposed factuality of that experience. The case of denial and doubt, on the contrary, focuses on the lack of cognitive experience on the part of the subject. Further note that Ramsey’s ad hoc definitions of lexical meaning also obscure the fact that, unlike verbs of emotion and feeling, verbs of doubt occupy a well-defined point on the scale of predicates that denote different degrees of truth value.

Finally, some minor remarks may be made. From the passages quoted one gets the impression that the concept of ‘action’ is taken in an unusually wide sense, since even ‘things’ are characterized as possible actors. More surprisingly, not one of the examples given contains a complement clause describing a real action. As a matter of fact, the concept of action seems to be intended to include states and processes only. Compare, e.g., ‘Dudo que sea culpable’ and ‘Celebré que le haya salido tan bien su empresa’, respectively.

As for the category of ‘expressions of denial or doubt’, it should be pointed out that it is composed of heterogeneous elements. As we saw earlier, doubt is a category of cognitive meaning. Denial, however, represents a category of illocutionary meaning. Specifically, the clause-embedding predicate negar belongs to the class of speech act verbs, as may be illustrated by the following example already mentioned before: ‘Niego que el ebanista tenga la intención de devolver el espejo’.
Note that, as far as the pragmatic interpretation of this sentence is concerned, the performative use of *niego* explicitly defines the speech act as a denial.

In regard to the construction of English textbooks of Spanish, the foregoing leads to the conclusion that, so far as the modal behavior of cognitive and evaluative predicates is involved, the parameters of focalizing truth value and defocalizing factualness of information should be the cornerstone of teaching modal distribution to English learners of Spanish. The results of the analyses carried out in the present study underline the rationality of this claim.

4. CONCLUSION

The conceptual framework adopted in the present paper derives from the intrinsic semantic relationship between cognitive and evaluative predicates. This relationship stems from the fact that evaluation presupposes cognition, which, in more specific terms, is equivalent to stating that the experiential of an evaluative predicate - syntactically, the subject, the indirect object, or a non-realized argument - is presupposed to be in an epistemic state. The concept of truth value, therefore, is essential to an adequate description of both cognitive and evaluative predicates. The difference between them depends on the functional status of the information conveyed by the embedded proposition. Cognitive predicates foreground or focalize this information while evaluative predicates background or defocalize it.

The modal distinction between cognitive and evaluative predicates can be recapitulated in the following way. In sentences containing an evaluative predicate the backgrounding of factual information requires the use of the subjunctive, whereas the foregrounding of factual information, which is triggered by specific syntactic or contextual factors, requires the use of the indicative. As for the expression of cognitive meaning, epistemic and doxastic predicates select the indicative mood, since they focus on positive and relatively positive truth value, respectively. Dubitative predicates select the subjunctive mood in their complement clauses, since they serve to indicate that the subject is not able to judge whether the embedded proposition is true or false.

In regard to the construction of English textbooks of Spanish, the foregoing leads to the conclusion that, as far as the modal behavior of cognitive and evaluative predicates is concerned, the parameters of focalizing different degrees of truth value and defocalizing factualness of information should be the cornerstone of teaching modal distribution to English learners of Spanish.

Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that *A textbook of modern Spanish*, selected as a representative specimen of normative grammar, fails to offer its users an integrated description of the modal distribution at issue. This is basically due to two factors: firstly, the book does not pay attention to the indicative mood as an autonomous paradigm, which, in hypotactic constructions, is in systematic opposition with the subjunctive; Secondly, the occurrence of the subjunctive in complement clauses subordinated to cognitive and evaluative main verbs is described in an ad hoc way, that is, in terms of idiosyncratic properties of verbs of emotion, feeling, doubt, and denial.
The above considerations show that, in regard to hierarchical levels of linguistic research, the present investigation, which is characteristic of a minimalistic approach to lexical meaning, should be assigned a place at the level of descriptive adequacy. In A textbook of modern Spanish, on the other hand, lexical meaning is represented from a maximalistic perspective. Due to the lack of explicitly formulated parameters, we may further characterize Ramsey’s grammar as a typical product of research conducted at the level of observational adequacy.

REFERENCES


