Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorBergantiños Cid, Gustavo
dc.contributor.authorVidal Puga, Juan José
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-19T11:49:07Z
dc.date.available2021-10-19T11:49:07Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10347/27022
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation has three main parts. The first part is devoted to transferable utility games with coalition structure. A levels bidding mechanism is presented. This mechanism is a generalization of the bidding mechanism by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). The levels bidding mechanism implements the Owen value (Owen, 1977) and the levels structure value (Winter, 1989). The second part is devoted to non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. The NTU consistent coalitional value is defined for this class of games. The NTU consistent coalitional value generalizes in a natural way both the Owen value to non- transferable utility games and the consistent value (Maschler and Owen, 1989, 1992) for games with coalition structure. In particular, two characterizations are proposed. One of them by means of consistency and the other one by means of balanced contributions. A random order value is also studied. This value arises as the generalization of expected average of marginal contributions which also characterizes both the Shapley value and the Owen value. However, this new value is neither consistent nor satisfies average contributions. Furthermore, the bargaining mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) is generalized for games with coalition structure. It is proved that the NTU consistent coalitional value arises in equilibrium for a wide class of games. A slight modification of this mechanism is also studied. However, the value that arises in equilibrium does not generalize the Owen value for transferable utility games. In the third part, rules that satisfy the different types of additivity are characterized. The studied games are allocation, bankruptcy, surplus and loss problems, both in the discrete and the continuous case. When additivity in the claims is considered, the rules that arise are the proportional and its weighted versions. When we consider additivity in both the claims and the estate, the arising rules are the equal-sharing rule (Moulin, 1987) and equal-loss (Herrero, Maschler and Villar, 1999) as well as their weighted versions.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectNTU
dc.subjectjuegos cooperativos
dc.subjectproblemas de asignación
dc.subject.classificationMaterias::Investigación::12 Matemáticas::1209 Estadística::120903 Análisis de datos
dc.subject.classificationMaterias::Investigación::12 Matemáticas::1209 Estadística::120904 Teoría y proceso de decisión
dc.subject.classificationMaterias::Investigación::12 Matemáticas::1208 Probabilidad::120803 Aplicación de la probabilidad
dc.titleOn additivity and implementation in games with coalition structure
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversidade de Santiago de Compostela. Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversidade de Santiago de Compostela. Centro Internacional de Estudos de Doutoramento e Avanzados (CIEDUS)


Files in this item

application/pdf
Name: rep_2469.pdf
Size: 22.80 Mb
Format: PDF


Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as  Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional





Harvesters:Useful links:
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela | Teléfonos: +34 881 811 000 e +34 982 820 000 | Contact Us | Send Feedback